Abstract
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
The role that time plays in economic decisions and behaviour is paramount, and has long been recognised. The literature is huge 1 , dating back at least to the 17 th century, and models of intertemporal allocation of resources are the staple diet for undergraduate students in economics.
However, actual behaviour is often at odds with conventional economic wisdom 2 .
We all shop around for the lower mortgage rate or the highest savings rate, but when the transaction is not purely financial behaviour seems less 'rational'. For instance, in the real estate market, there is evidence 3 that we tend to stay focused on achieving the maximum possible price, and only a small proportion of house sellers does revise the asking price downwards, in spite of the obvious trade-off between sale price and time on the market.
More generally, casual evidence would suggest that when people are involved in a task where time is not the only relevant dimension, its effect may be somewhat "watered down" 4 . My objective in this paper is to test this hypothesis. The specific task I consider is a bargaining situation, so as to study whether or not bargaining over time incorporates peculiar features which cannot be accounted for by traditional experimental design.
My results indicate that, although when involved in a task which involves purely time subjects do 'react' to it, when the principal task is such that time is only one of the relevant features involved, it seems not to matter. I will refer to this as time prominence (or lack of it).
The reason why I look at a bargaining task is that time preferences (i.e. impatience) are considered as one of the fundamental forces driving the outcome in non-cooperative models of bargaining 5 . This feature is translated in experimental settings by modelling the agents' preference for an earlier (rather than a delayed) agreement by means of an exogenous reduction of the surplus bargained over every time disagreement occurs. So if, say, subjects are negotiating over the division of a surplus between them, the experimenter can impose a rate of time preferences τ i on player i, 1 For choices among 'single' time dependent outcomes Fishburn and Rubinstein (1980) provide representation theorems for utility maximising agent with a monotonic and continuous preference ordering on X×T (where X is the set of outcomes and T is the set of times). Meyer (1976) considers the case of preferences over sequences of time dependent outcomes, as more recently Fishburn and Edwards (1997) . See Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2001) for a thorough review of these issues. 2 The stark contrast between actual behaviour and the theoretical conjecture on Homo Oeconomicus' conduct are commanding more and more the attention of the professionals. See for instance Thaler (1991) , Elster (1998) , Rabin (1998) , O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) , Rabin, Goeree and Holt (2000) , Starmer (2000) , Henrich et al. (2001) and Loewenstein (2001) to cite just a few.
3 Ortalo-Magné and Merlo (2000) find that only about 25% of house sellers in England lower the selling price (after an average of 11 weeks on the market). Anglin et al (2001) finds a higher proportion for Canada (around 46%). 4 The fact that "distractors" worsen task performance is well reserached in the cognitive neurosciences. For instance, interference (from subsequent terms in a list of numbers) impairs short term memory (see Gazzaniga, Ivry and Mangum (1998) , chapter 7, and references therein), and time preferences are dramatically affected by addiction (see for instance Bickel and Marsch, 2001) . 5 Theoretical non-cooperative bargaining models with an alternating offers structure and proportional discounting have proven somewhat more popular than those with fixed costs of delay; even more so in the (corresponding to the intertemporal discount factor i i τ δ + = 1 1 ) by having the surplus reduced by a factor 6 δ i at every round following disagreement (so that subject i's share x i is worth δ i x i if agreement is reached at time t). Whether or not this is a legitimate way to render time preferences in a laboratory environment is then crucial for the interpretation of the experimental results.
The development of theoretical tools for analysing non cooperative bargaining and its relevance for real life have happily conjured to favour the flourishing of a rich literature on experimental models of bargaining over "shrinking" pies 7 . But all these experiments share the problem that they try and implement the theoretical framework of bargaining over time in experimental settings where on the contrary time has no role at all. What these experiments really study is therefore the extent to which backward induction type of reasoning is "used", if at all, by subjects in negotiations 8 .
In this paper I therefore consider alongside "conventional" experimental settings -where time is modelled as some cost to be incurred in case of failure to reach immediate agreement -a bargaining game where disagreement entails receiving the agreed share at a later point in time. In order to make the "conventional" and "real time" comparable, real time bargaining is preceded by a stage in which the subjects' time preferences are assessed.
There is a problem, though, with addressing the issue of time preferences directly, as the debate on how actual time preferences should be modelled is still as open as it is unsettled. A number of violations of representations of time preference of the form outlined above have been noted 9 . Often "dread"'' and "savouring" effects'' are observed 10 , which refer to the fact that people prefer to postpone a pleasant activity (so as to enjoy also the "build up"'to it), or to anticipate an experimental bargaining literature. For a review of the huge literature sparked by Rubinstein (1982) , see for instance Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Binmore, Osborne and Rubinstein (1992) . 6 Such discount factor can be imposed to be the same for both players (as for instance in Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1985) , Guth and Tietz (1988) , Neelin, Sonnenschein and Spiegel, 1988) , or different (as in Ochs and Roth, 1989) .
7 See Roth (1995) for a thorough survey of this vast literature; Rapoport ET AL consider alternating offers bargaining models where the cost of delay is some fixed constant. 8 The debate has initially focused on checking the accuracy of subgame perfect equilibrium as a predictor of the outcome of experimental negotiations. Failing that, the next step has been to trying and individuate possible heuristics used by experimental subjects. The evidence on this is somewhat mixed (see e.g. Prasnikar and Roth (1992) , who investigate off the equilibrium path incentives to players to conform to behaviour which is subgame perfect in both ultimatum and "best shot" games.), and it is not uncommon to observe subjects reject an offer and make a counter-proposal that leaves them with a smaller payoff than the one previously rejected. Thus, there might be fairness considerations lurking in the background, which may trigger rejection of an 'insultingly low' offer. This in turn poses the problem of detecting what sort of agreements people deem fair; on this, see for instance Binmore, Morgan, Shaked and Sutton (1991) . However, see also Forsythe et al. (1994) for an example where bargaining power is totally exploited in the absence of punishment. Other studies of fairness are for instance Bolton and Ockenfels (2001) and Fehr and Gachter (2000) . 9 For a survey of these violations, see Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) or Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) . For a thorough treatment of issues concerning choice over time see Elster and Loewenstein (1992) and more recently Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2001) . 10 Results of this kind have been obtained for instance by Loewenstein (1987) .
unpleasant task (so as to avoid contemplating this unfavourable outcome for too long).
Furthermore, observed preferences are rarely stationary, and people often exhibit a strict preference for immediacy: they may be indifferent between some immediate outcome and a delayed one, but in case they are both brought forward in time, the immediate outcome loses completely its attractiveness 11 . Besides, there is an abundance of papers which argue that discounting behaviour is more consistent with hyperbolic rather than exponential discounting 12 .
In this paper I take an agnostic view on the competing theories on time preferences, and do not fully investigate alternative possible representations. As it will become clear further below, for my purposes it is not necessary to estimate discount factors 13 precisely. It is enough for me to be able to establish that subjects are indeed sensitive to the timing of a monetary reward by some form of (incentive compatible) measure of time attitude. Then, I will be able to show that the experimental designs conventionally adopted for bargaining games fail to approximate negotiations over timedependent outcomes, where bargaining behaviour is totally unaffected by the cost of delay.
The experimental design for this paper is described in the next section. Section 3 overviews the results, which are discussed in detail in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes.
Experimental design Experimental design Experimental design Experimental design
The experiment was conducted over two consecutive days (during term time) at the Economics Department of LUISS University in Rome. The subjects were first year undergraduates with no prior exposition to Game Theory.
Three treatments were considered. The first one consisted of two stages. In the first stage time preferences (over delays of one and two months) were elicited by using a modification of the Becker-Marschack-De Groot procedure 14 , hence this treatment is referred to as BDM. In the second stage subjects played a two round bargaining game on the division of a sum of money (300 monetary units 15 ). The other two treatments consisted of the second stage only (bargaining). As explained more in detail below, in the BDM treatment delayed agreement (i.e. agreement in the second round) resulted in subjects receiving their payment with a time lag of one month. For the other two treatments, agreement in the second round entailed either a payment of a fixed fee (out 11 This phenomenon is reminiscent of violations of expected utility theory. For instance, Burgos, Grant and Kajii (1997) model an alternating offers bargaining model where agents' preferences exhibit a certainty effect (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . Loewenstein and Prelec (1991) present a treatment of choice over time and under risk from a unifying'' perspective.
12 Hyperbolic discount functions imply that discount rates decrease over time. For evidence documenting this phenomenon, consult for instance Ainslie (1975) , Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil (1989) , Laibson (1997) , Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) and Thaler (1981) . On the contrary, other papers have argued that hyperbolic discounting does not accurately describe time preference (e.g. Rubinstein, 2000 and Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue, 2001) . 13 For a thorough review of papers measuring discount factors see Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2001) .
14 See Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1964), or Bohm, Linden and Sonnegard (1997 In the first stage subjects' preferences were elicited by a modification of the Becker-De GrootMarschak procedure, where a good is substituted for a "bad" (waiting). More precisely, each of the 40 subject was told that by participating in the experiment s/he was entitled to collect a prize of 300 monetary units, which however would have to be collected with a delay of X months. They were then asked to write down on special forms the amount of money (limit price) LP they would be willing to pay in order to avoid having to wait X months to collect their entitlement. The forms were then collected and the declared limit price was compared with a randomly 16 determined asking price. If the latter was lower than the named pay price, then the subject would receive the payment net of the random asking price the next day 17 ; if instead the asking price was equal or greater than the declared limit price, the subjects would receive the full sum with one day and X months and one day delay.
In order to test the constancy of time preferences, subjects were asked to declare two limit prices, one for a delay X=1 month and one with delay X=2 months; consequently, two (possibly distinct) asking prices (one for each version) were drawn. In the end one for the two versions (one or two months) was randomly selected, and payment proceeded accordingly.
As with the usual BDM, here too the dominant strategy for the subjects is to state the true reservation price: the incentive to bid a low price is offset by the fact that the lower the limit price, the less likely it is that the asking price is even lower, resulting in the delayed collection of the prize. Thus, it was possible to measure the subjects' monetary evaluation of the time unit X.
Subjects then were told that the first stage of the experiment was over, and that they would now have to negotiate with an anonymous opponent to share some money (additional 300 monetary units). In the bargaining stage negotiations proceeded over two rounds, with the role of first proposer (Bargainer East) and first responder (Bargainer West) assigned randomly, and with subjects of each type sitting in separate rooms.
In order to exchange proposals subjects had to fill in a paper bargaining form (see appendix)
which was carried between rooms by an assistant. Each form reported for each of the two bargainers the one month limit price elicited in the first stage.
15 Each monetary unit corresponded to 100 Italian Liras (ITL), which at the time (May 2000) corresponded to about 30 British Pence roughly. 16 The asking price was determined by randomly drawing three table tennis balls, one for each digit of the asking price, from three bags, the first of which contained three balls only numbered 0 to 2 (first digit of the asking price) and the other two containing 10 balls each numbered 0 to 9 (for the second an third digits of the asking price). Thus any figure between 000 and 299 had equal probability to be drawn. 17 In this way all subjects had to come back for payment, whether this was "immediate" or delayed of one or two months. This way possible confounds due to the "hassle"'of coming back only in case of either one or two month delay were removed.
Agreement in the first round entailed payment on the following day; agreement in the second round entailed payment with one month delay, whereas failure to reach agreement resulted in no subject receiving any payment.
On remark which is important at this point is that in experimental test involving delayed monetary payments the issue of credibility arises. In the experiment of this paper, however, I do not think this aspect was particularly relevant. The trustworthiness of the enterprise was corroborated by the involvement of a senior member of faculty there, who took part in the recruitment of the subjects. The reliability aspects concerning the practicalities as to payment was ensured by telling subjects that for the "immediate" payment (i.e. "tomorrow") I would have been available on campus for the whole of the next day. For the "delayed payment" (one and two month, depending on the version extracted) separate envelopes containing cash would have been sent by courier on the specified date to the Students office on Campus -which is very smallwhere subjects could then collect them. Anonymity was preserved throughout by assigning a random "Personal Identification Code" to each student, who would have to present it in order to collect his/her payment. In both these treatments the task consisted of the bargaining phase only. As in the BDM treatment, 40 subjects were randomly assigned one role (either Bargaining East or Bargainer West) and seated in two different rooms. The bargaining forms used were similar to the one for the BDM treatment, with the idea to replicate in each of the 20 bargaining pairs the costs elicited in stage 1 of the BDM treatment. The way these costs were modelled was however different.
The FXD treatment was based on a fixed cost of delay: agreement in the second round of negotiations resulted in the payment of a fixed fee out of the agreed share. In the FXD treatment a "no bakrupcy rule" established that any agreement in the second round would have to be such that shares were enough to cover both agent's fees in order not to be void (thus resulting in no payment at all). For each bargainer this fee corresponded to each of the one month limit prices observed in the BDM treatment, and bargainers were matched so that each pair of negotiators in the FXD treatment "mirrored" exactly one bargaining pair in the BDM treatment. Similarly, in the DSC treatment subjects had to divide between them 300 chips, worth initially one monetary unit each.
If agreement was reached in the second round, the value of each chip would diminish of some amount, which was determined so as to correspond to the pair of limit prices of each bargaining pair in the BDM session (see section 5.3 below for the details).
In both FXD and DSC the bargaining forms reported the cost for delayed agreement (fixed or proportional) to both players. Subjects were paid at the end of the experiment. The first thing to observe is that overall subjects displayed sensitivity to the timing of a monetary reward for the time frame chosen 19 . Specifically, the amount of money subjects were prepared to pay in order to avoid a one month delay in payment was statistically greater than zero. Furthermore, for 23 out of 40 subjects the limit price increased in the "two months" version, and the two observed median of the limit price distributions (10 and 35 monetary units for the "one month" and "two month" versions, respectively) were statistically significant (the Wilcoxon signed rank statistics is -3.182 for a test of equality of medians in the two distributions).
The next question to ask is whether this time sensitivity is carried to the bargaining phase.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to see which model (fixed or proportional cost of delay) best mimics bargaining over time.
To start with, consider treatment effects on bargaining behaviour More interestingly, the distribution of claims for both DSC and FXD is asymmetric around the median, unlike the one for BDM. That is, in both DSC and FXD the distribution of claims is skewed to the right, revealing a more aggressive behaviour of first movers in this case
22
. 18 Here I report only part of the statistical tests. The full set of results is in sections 4 and 5, with further details contained in the appendices. 19 In pilot experiments I tried a shorther time horizon, setting X=1 week and X=2 weeks. In this case only a very small subset of the subjects displayed any sensitivity at all to time. However, those who did had marked differences in costs between one and two weeks delay. 20 The frequencies for offers of Bargainer East can be found in tables and figures in section 5 below.
21 I use ) = med(X i -Y j ) as an unbiased estimate of the shift parameter ) in G(x)=F(x-)), where F and G represent the response distributions of subjects in two different treatments. Note that the Wilcoxon test for instance would test the null hypothesis F=G against the alternative that one distribution stochastically dominates the other. The estimator ) is median unbiased (i.e. E() )=), and ) is distributed symmetrically around ), which is the median of the distribution of ) . . See Lehmann (1975) , chapter 2.
22 Randles et al. (1981) 's test statistic for distributional symmetry, returns 2.330609 for FXD and 3.047766 for DSC, while only .3409593 for BDM. The statistic is distributed as a standard normal under the null hypothesis of symmetric distribution, so that for both FXD and DSC the test rejects the null hypothesis for BDM the correlation coefficient is much lower (.154) and anyway not statistically significant.
The correlation between East's claim and the limit price differential (limit price of bargainer Eastlimit price of bargainer West) is even stronger (though this time is negative, obviously) for both DSC and FXD, whereas once again in the BDM treatment this correlation is low and not significant 23 .
All these results taken together support the hypothesis of lack of time prominence: although bargainers do prefer their monetary rewards sooner rather than later in an exercise which involves merely time considerations, embedding the possibility of delayed agreement in a bargaining setup completely focuses attention away from the potential cost of delay: subjects in the BDM experiment seem to discard completely their opponent's cost for time. In this treatment two norms, the equal split and the 2/3-1/3 split work as very powerful attractors.
On the other hand, when the bargaining framework is completely devoid of time considerations, and the penalty for delayed agreement is directly monetary in nature, subjects do react to the cost of delay, and try to tailor (at least to some extent) their actions to the financial (opportunity) cost of the responder. In this case the claim of first movers is positively correlated to the responders of symmetry against the one sided alternative of right-skewedness at 1% significance (see Hollander and Wolfe (1999) , comment 61). Details of this test are in appendix A.2.3. 23 All these results are detailed in section 5 and in the appendices.
cost of rejection, and even more to the differential between own and opponent's cost. For both these treatments (FXD and DSC), as we know from plenty of experimental evidence (see Roth, 1995 What about rejected offers? In the BDM treatment the same pattern observed in the first round is repeated, with a concentration of offers on the two norms. Incidentally, these counteroffers are not always accepted; indeed the BDM treatment was the most fractious, and agents seemed to resent what they perceived as "low" offers, as time cost were not taken into account.
For both the other treatments (FXD and DSC) it is possible to compute the subgame perfect equilibrium claims in the second round (off the equilibrium path; see section 5 below). In both FXD and DSC responders move boldly away from the equal division (which is never offered) and embrace a 2/3-1/3 convention.
The results are analysed in detail in the following sections. In Figure 2 , which refers to all data collected, it can readily be seen that for two individuals preference reversal occurred (points lying below the diagonal). These have been removed from 4 4 4: : : : Qualitative changes in limit prices (two months-one month). Negative, positive and no change are indicated with -, + and =, respectively. The column denoted by =(0) refers to limit prices which were zero and did not change over time; the column denoted by =(1) refers to limit prices which were only equal to 1, and did not change over time.
For 6 individuals preferences appear to be insensitive to the time horizon chosen (i.e. their limit price is always zero); further 9 of them are sensitive to the first delay (i.e. one month), but not to the second (i.e., the difference between two months and one month limit price is zero). However, for 23 subjects the limit price increased (from a positive value) between one and two month. The dispersion of the data can be visualised with the aid of Figure 5 Table  Table Table  Table 1 1 1 1: : : : Descriptive statistics for observed limit prices A Wilcoxon test performed on the data is consistent with the hypothesis that the two month (TM) limit price distribution first order stochastically dominates the one month (OM)'limit price distribution, that is, TM has a statistically significant higher median than OM. Note that this effect is enhanced if we exclude from the analysis the cases which exibhited preference reversal (indicated in parenthesis in Table 2 Table  Table Table  Table 2 2 2 2: : : : Test for equality of medians between one month and two month limit prices.
All in all, then, the results above support the hypothesis that subjects were sensitive to the time frame chosen. On the other hand, in the FXD treatment in second round player West has to ensure that player 1 receives an amount sufficient to cover his second period tax, as because of the "nobankruptcy constraint"'any agreement which failed to cover both player's cost would be void. Thus the main difference between the s.p.e. first offers in the DSC and FXD treatment is that under DSC the discount treatment first offers depend only on the responder's cost of delay, whereas in the FXD case equilibrium first offers depend on both player's cost of delay.
Proportional costs of delay (discount factors) in the DSC treatment were constructed quite crudely from the one month limit prices elicited from subjects via the BDM procedure as 300 300
, where LP iBDM is the limit price of the "mirror" bargainer West in the BDM treatment. This way of deriving discount factors may under-estimate the corresponding actual discount factors for the subject in the BDM treatment, especially if the utility function is not linear in money. However the only purpose of proportional discounting in this paper is to evaluate whether it constitutes the appropriate frame to describe the essential features of negotiations over real time. What is crucial for my results is that both the "correct" discount factor underlying the subjects' preferences and my own crude representation of it are some function of the limit prices -a mild requirement. This is enough to allow a correct interpretation of the various non-parametric tests 24 my analysis relies on, for which the only relevant information is rank. Consequently, these tests are invariant to any order preserving transformation of the variable of interest.
With this caveat in mind, it is possible to express the s.p.e. opening offer in the discount case as Table  Table Table  Table 3 3 3 3: : : : Conversion between elicited limit prices (LP iBDM ) and discount factors (δ i ). All numbers in hundreds of ITL.
Subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are described in the following Table  Table Table  Table 4 4 4 4: Subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in FXD and DSC. . . .
In all cases East's claims have wildly exceeded the s.p.e. predictions. Similarly for West's claims in the second round. Significantly, though, none of the second period offers were at the equal split level. This seems to show that as long as some focal point/convention other than the equal split is available it can be used to anchor and justify more aggressive behaviour.
These results are analysed in more detail below.
5.1 5.1 5.1
Elicited time preferences (BDM) Elicited time preferences (BDM) Elicited time preferences (BDM) Elicited time preferences (BDM)
The frequencies are reported in Table 5 , and visualised in Figure 6 . The first thing to observe is that although the modal claim is 150, there is another "mass point" at 200. Furthermore, more than 55% of the offers lie above the sample mode, as well as the sample median (which is 170). Table  Table Table  Table 5 So, it seems that as a heuristic subjects used the either a fifty-fifty or a 2/3-1/3 convention 26 (recall that the amount to be divided was 300 monetary units).
But which of these offers are accepted? Below is the distribution of successful and rejected proposals. Not surprisingly, the highest offers get rejected.
prices. However such discrepancies are so small that this does not constitute a problem for the analysis. 26 The choice of convention may depend on the opponent limit prices, however the evidence in this respect is weak. Specifically, the average limit price for bargainer West is 36.83 in correspondence of the 200 mark, and either 13.29 or 49 in correspondence of the 150 claim, depending on whether the observation related to the only subject with limit price 299 is excluded or not from the analysis. So, while dropping the outlier seems to suggest some rule of thumb for the choice of convention, there is not enough evidence to warrant the deletion of this observation from the data-set. Furthermore, remember that at any rate there is no evidence of correlation between opponents' limit prices and own offers. Table  Table Table  Table 6 6 6 6: : : : Test for equality of medians between accepted and rejected offers in the first round.
However, there is now a significant negative correlation of rejected offers with the rejector's limit price, as can be seen from the table below. This reinforces the conclusions drawn above that limit prices are not taken into account in the bargaining phase of the BDM treatment: the responders with the higher limit prices seem oblivious of their "condition" and reject also pretty "central" offers, as visualised in the figure above. Table  Table Table  Table 7 7 Table  Table Table  Table 8 8 8 8: Correlations based on Kendall's τ test -counteroffers
But perhaps the most striking feature is that counteroffers in the second round did give the proposer more than the rejected offer in terms of monetary payoff, but a smaller "utility"once the limit price is taken into account. This is visualised in the figure below, which represents the differences between the own claim and the rejected offer in the previous period. While all monetary differences are strictly positive and of considerable value, once the cost of waiting is taken into account 50% of these differences become either zero or negative (and considerably so).
BDM -second round proposals (own claim -rejected offer)
Case Number Of all treatments, this was the most fractious: 50% of first offers were initially rejected, and three of the negotiations ended with no agreement, with both bargainers obtaining a null payoff.
These results suggest that, although subjects did show a sensitivity to time (i.e. when confronted with a task which involves purely time, subjects do notice), when the principal task is such that time is only one of the relevant features involved, it seems not to matter. There is not a great deal of dispersion in the initial offers (as compared to the other treatments, as we will see below), which are uncorrelated to limit prices, and agents concentrate their proposals around two conventions, 50/50 and 2/3-1/3.
The rejected offers are indeed correlated with respondent's limit prices: however, the fact that they are rejected shows that responders do not recognise the role of time. This is further reinforced by two facts:
• counteroffers follow a similar pattern to those of first movers: proposals are uncorrelated with limit prices, are not very dispersed and concentrate around the two conventions.
• In monetary terms counteroffer are advantageous to bargainer West; however, they become negative if limit prices are taken into account. 100.0 Table  Table Table  Table 9 9 9 9: : : : Frequency distribution of Bargainer East's claims Moreover, this distribution has a narrower support than that for the BDM, as depicted in the The first thing to note is that, as in the BDM treatment, a considerable proportion (40%) of the claims are at the equal split division; however, although 50% of the claims are in excess of the equal split, the second convention observed in the BDM treatment (i.e. the 2/3-1/3 partition) is no longer focal. This comes as no surprise once the relationship with the opponent's cost of rejection is inspected: as observed in section 7, opening offers are significantly positively correlated to responder's cost of rejecting an offer, and a nonparametric test of distributional symmetry shows that both distributions (East's claims and West's cost of rejection) are skewed to the right 27 .
Consider now rejections. As above, the highest offers end up being rejected, and there is a significant difference in the medians of the accepted and rejected proposals. Table  Table Table  Table 10 10 10 10: Test for equality of medians between accepted and rejected offers in the first round.
Furthermore, only seven proposals (rather than 10 in the BDM treatment) are rejected.
Counteroffers appear to be rational insofar as they yield the first mover less than he originally claimed for.
27 See appendix A.2.3. The data show a less 'recognisable' pattern as compared to the BDM case, as shown in the figure below. Responders seem very aware of the weakness which derives from their own cost of delay, and apparently fail to realise that there is a role reversal. Incidentally, during postexperimental debriefings, in the mains those subjects who were selected to be responders in the first round (i.e. bargainers West) felt that they were at a disadvantage in negotiations because of their role as responders.
This anxiety about own cost of disagreement tallies well with the experimental behaviour. As Table  Table Table  Table 11 11 11 11: Correlations based on Kendall's τ test The analysis above seems to suggest that a fixed cost of disagreement is very clearly perceived by the subjects: First movers' offer are significantly negatively correlated with responders' costs of disagreement, and the correlation coefficient is high (in excess of .4 in absolute value). The effect of costs of delay is significant in offers in the second round too. Only, in this case subjects perceive their own cost as a source of reduced bargaining power, and their proposals are less aggressive the higher their own cost of disagreement. 28 Recall that no such behaviour is observed in the BDM treatment. The support of the distribution of initial claims (which is skewed to the right) in this treatment is much larger than for the other two cases; as shown in appendix A.2.2 this distribution is more dispersed than for the BDM treatment, whereas non statistically significant differences can be detected with respect to the FXD treatment.
Although the equal split constitutes the modal claim (and accounts for 40% of the cases), both the median and the average initial claims are higher, at 160 and 170, respectively. Moreover, 60%
of claims do not correspond to any established norm; once again, the key to explain this pattern of offers is the positive correlation with the opponent's cost of rejecting an offer (see appendix A.2.4).
The frequencies are reported in the Table  Table Table  Table 12 Table  Table Table  Table 13 13 13 13: Test for equality of medians between accepted and rejected offers in the first round.
Regarding counteroffers, they are "rational", in the sense that they yield a discounted payoff which is in excess of the rejected offer. Unlike the other two treatments, here payoffs in case of agreement are (by construction) always non-negative.
As in the FXD treatment (and to less extent in the BDM treatment), the 1/3-2/3 division seem to attract most counteroffers, as the picture below shows: Finally, as in all other treatments, bargainer West's offer is uncorrelated to any of the limit prices 29 .
The analysis above seem to suggest that a discounted cost of disagreement is clearly perceived by the subjects, which take it into account when making their offers. On the other hand, responders are more aware of their own vulnerability in the first round due to their own cost of disagreement. This effect persists in the second round, where counteroffers are negatively correlated to their own cost of disagreement. 6 6 6 6 Discussion Discussion Discussion Discussion
One point that is worth stressing is that, regardless of the specific discount factors underlying subjects' preferences, the fact that delay is imposed in the same way in both stages of the BDM treatment implies that there is no reason to expect a different evaluation of monetary outcomes in the two phases as far as time attitudes are concerned 30 . Thus, it seems reasonable to attribute any differences in the attitude towards time to the superimposition of the bargaining structure.
The upshot of this analysis is therefore that even if subjects do show that they are sensitive to the timing of a monetary reward, superimposing another task (bargaining) introduces a distractor which focuses attention away from time considerations altogether. This is all the more striking when one considers that the negotiations in which subjects were involved were very stylised, and were still on monetary outcomes. On the other hand, when the costs of disagreement are explicitly expressed in monetary terms, they do affect bargaining behaviour. .000 .000 Table  Table Table  Table 14 Table  Table Table  Table 15 15 15 15: : : : Wilcoxon test for equality of medians in the distribution of East's claim in all treatments.
The Wilcoxon test however relies on the assumption that the observations come from the same distribution, in particular assuming identity of variance. As -based on test which follow in this appendices -equality of variance (and surely of distribution) is rejected, a Robust Rank Order test (which is appropriate in this case) was performed. The statistic 32 is calculated as 32 Tabled values for this statistic can be found in Fligner et al (1981) . The distribution of the statistic under the null of no change in location approaches the standard normal distribution as the sample sizes increase (as in the case for this paper). See for instance Siegel and Castellan (1988) . Table  Table Table  Table 16 16 16 16: : : : Robust Rank Order test for equality of medians in the distribution of East's claim in all treatments.
Finally, in support of the above note that the median unbiased estimate of the treatment effect can be computed as ) = med(X i -Y j )=0. Table  Table Table  Table 17 .36 .009 .001 Table  Table Table  Table 18 Table  Table Table  Table 19 19 Table  Table Table  Table 20 20 20 20: Correlations based on Kendall's τ test -East's offer in all treatments (no outliers) B B B B Structure of the game in the three treatments (picture handed out to Structure of the game in the three treatments (picture handed out to Structure of the game in the three treatments (picture handed out to Structure of the game in the three treatments (picture handed out to subjects) subjects) subjects) subjects) 
